Abstract
Introduction
potential to become a parent itself.
133
These fitness payoffs are modeled as follows. The reduction in the probability that a delayed individual becomes a parent, independently of whether the delayed individual helps, is denoted by c d .
The additional reduction in the probability that a delayed individual becomes a parent due to helping is c h . On the other hand, the increase in the probability of becoming a parent due to the exploitation of the maternal patch while not helping is b e . For simplicity, I ignore any frequency dependence in the 
where the cost of efficiency and inefficiency are defined as
first-brood individual that helps increases the survival of recipient second-brood offspring. The 138 increase in survival received by a random second-brood recipient is
where Y is the average helping probability among delayed individuals in the patch, and b max is the 140 benefit a recipient of help gets when all delayed individuals in the patch help at their maximum 141 efficiency. Denoting by s 0 the baseline probability of becoming a parent (i.e., the probability that 142 offspring become parents when manipulation does not occur), I let b max = 1 − s 0 .
143
I follow the methods of Taylor and Frank (1996) and Frank (1997) to obtain dynamic equations for relatedness (Hamilton, 1972 , Bulmer, 1994 and u j are the equilibrium frequency of individuals of class i and j respectively. For simplicity, I drop triggered behavior as being induced rather than being manipulated.
Evolutionary change in each trait

184
The population-average manipulation p, resistance q, and helping efficiency y increase respectively (see eqs. (19) in the Appendix) when 
When condition (5) holds, the coevolutionary dynamics of resistance q and helping efficiency y are as described in Fig. 4A . Acquiescence can be disfavored at the start of the process, and the evolution of helping efficiency can render acquiescence favored if the population starts in the dark gray area in Fig. 4A. The population starts in the either the gray or dark gray area in Fig. 4A if the next condition is met.
Second, induced behavior requires that the probability of resistance is initially small enough, which occurs if
where
The variables with subscript "0" refer to the value of the variable at the initial time. The quantity S 205 measures selection for helping efficiency, which is positive when condition (5) holds. V q and V y are the 206 additive genetic variances for resistance and helping efficiency respectively.
207
Condition (6a) is related to Hamilton's rule (Hamilton, 1964 (Hamilton, , 1970 ). Hamilton's rule states that 
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213
(b 0 r > c 0 ). Condition (6a) may then be seen as defining a relaxed Hamilton's rule, which rather than 214 giving the direction of selection specifies when acquiescence can be obtained in the long run.
215
The evolution of induced behavior also requires two conditions regarding manipulation. First, 216 manipulation must be favored when first-brood offspring help at their maximum efficiency (ineq.
217
(S25a) in the SI). Second, the evolution of helping efficiency must be able to render manipulation 218 favored (ineq. (S25c) in the SI). If the probability of manipulation is initially small, the second condition 219 regarding manipulation simply states that manipulation must be favored initially. 
Conditions (7a) and (7b) respectively state that both manipulation and acquiescence must be favored 221 when helping efficiency is maximal; condition (7c) states that manipulation must be initially favored;
222
and condition (7d) guarantees that acquiescence becomes favored as the population evolves.
223
The evolutionary resolution of manipulation conflict occurs when induced behavior is obtained and 224 acquiescence is not initially favored (i.e., conditions (7) are met but condition (4b) is not met initially).
225
The region of parameter space in which the conflict is resolved is narrow (black regions in Fig. 5 ).
226
12 . CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International license peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It is made available under a The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not . http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/003707 doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Mar. 31, 2014;  manipulation is that the evolution of resistance to manipulation can reduce or eliminate the 295 manipulated behaviors (e.g., Parker and Macnair, 1979 , Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995 , Gavrilets and 296 Hayashi, 2006 , Reuter and Keller, 2001 , Kawatsu, 2013 . However, the benefits and costs of the 297 manipulated behavior can evolve if they have a genetic basis (Charlesworth, 1978, Worden and Levin, 298 2007, Akcay and Roughgarden, 2011). Benefits and costs of a manipulated behavior can have a genetic 299 basis since they depend on the extent with which the manipulated behavior is expressed. Yet, how the 300 evolution of payoffs can affect the nature and outcome of the conflict is not known. I have shown that 301 the manipulation conflict can disappear as a result of the evolution of payoffs released by manipulation.
302
The reason is that manipulation can simultaneously favor resistance and the efficiency with which the 303 manipulated behavior is expressed. Since the conflict disappears, I refer to the resulting behavior as 304 being induced rather than as being manipulated. The resolution of conflict has implications for our 305 understanding of the evolution of advanced eusociality in particular, and for the evolution of Second, for the conflict to be eliminated, resistance must be initially imperfect. I have assumed that 322 the manipulated behavior is performed entirely by the subjects of manipulation. So, if they resist with 323 full probability, no manipulated behavior is expressed regardless of how hard manipulators try. In 
where s k is the survival of k-th-brood offspring (i.e., the probability that k-th-brood offspring become 597 mothers) and f k is the maternal fertility through k-th-brood offspring (i.e., the number of offspring 598 produced as brood k).
599
For simplicity, I assume that the fraction of female offspring produced is the same in the first and second broods. Let σ be the fraction of offspring that are female. Because for first-and second-brood offspring to become mothers they must be female, then the survival of first-brood offspring is
Let Q be the average resistance probability among manipulated first-brood offspring in the maternal patch. Then, the survival of second-brood offspring is
Let α be the fraction of offspring that belong to the first brood, and let n be the total number of offspring that a mother produces. Each offspring must be weighted by the genetic contribution towards it (Taylor, 1990) . The genetic contribution of the mother toward offspring of sex i is η i (i.e., for sexual diploids, η i = 1/2; for haplodiploids, η ♀ = 1/2 while η ♂ = 1). The genetic contribution of a mother to her offspring is thus on average η = ση ♀ + (1 − σ)η ♂ . Hence, maternal fertility through first and second broods is
From eq. (29) in Taylor and Frank (1996) and eqs. (6) and (2) in Frank (1997), assuming weak selection and weak mutation, the evolutionary change in the population-average value trait value z (= p, q, y) can be approximated by
where w i j is the i j -th entry in the transition matrix W, g z is the breeding value for trait z in the actor, V z 600 is the additive genetic variance for trait z, v i is the individual reproductive value for class-i individuals, 
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the individual reproductive values
and the asymptotic growth rate
Because the available resources for offspring production only allow the mother to produce a number 604 of offspring that maintains the population size constant, the number of offspring is
in which case the asymptotic growth rate is λ = 1. Since competition is global, the number of offspring 606 n depends on the population-average trait values p, q, and y rather than on local average trait values.
607
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is the regression relatedness of an actor in class i 610 toward a recipient in class j , where g z j is the breeding value for z in the recipient and g z i is that in the 611 actor. Hence, r j i is an equilibrium relatedness.
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Figure legends
613
Figure 1: The three decisions individuals can make. Mothers manipulate with probability p first-brood offspring to stay as adults. Manipulated first-brood offspring resist with probability q and leave without delay. Otherwise, they acquiesce with probability 1 − q and stay for some period. Acquiescing individuals help with probability y to raise the second brood.
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, and
c ineff = 0.012.
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